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This paper adopts a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator to examine the impact of privati-
sation on wages in the Portuguese banking industry for the period 1989-97. The design of
the reform and the nature of dataset employed (matched employer-employee) provided a
particularly important opportunity to analyse the eﬀects of privatisation on diﬀerent demo-
graphic groups, using multiple control groups, and considering the timing of the eﬀects. The
empirical evidence suggests a U-shaped relationship between wage variation and time period
of restructuring, regardless of the choice of the comparison group, for those employees, either
men or women, retained by privatised ﬁrms.
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1 Introduction
The impacts of privatisation on labour market outcomes are potentially substantial. On the one
hand, public sector industrial relations are to some extent separate from private sector ones and
have distinct features. For instance, public sector organisations tend to pursue a multiplicity of
often conﬂicting objectives whereas private sector ﬁrms can focus more narrowly on generating
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1proﬁts. In addition, public pay determination tends to respond more to political pressures
rather than to markets or ﬁrm performance. In the past, public union leaders have often been
able to gain advantages by exploiting public corporation managers contacts with politicians and
members of government, in a near or total monopoly bargaining position. On the other hand,
much of the debate about the desirability of privatisation has included labour market outcomes
(employment and pay levels). In contrast to trade unions, the proponents of privatisation hope
that privatisation restructuring will reduce overmanning and excessive pay levels and beneﬁts.
However, many of the studies of privatisation to date have focused on processes and institu-
tions. In fact, most of the work has actually been concerned with whether or not the transfer
of ownership from public to private sector leads to an improvement in corporate performance1.
Important distinctions between cost/defensive and revenue/strategic restructuring have been
observed by Grosfeld and Roland (1996) but the exact channels through which the expected ef-
ﬁciency improvements of the ﬁrm occur are still not known. Research focusing on the eﬀects of
privatisation on labour market outcomes (both theoretical and empirical) is, in general, scarce,
inconclusive and almost exclusively conﬁned to the United Kingdom experience2.O n ee x c e p t i o n
is the (empirical) eﬀect on the total level of employment of the ﬁrm, which is often examined
in the industrial literature as an extra ﬁrm performance indicator. In respect to the impact of
privatisation on wages (both employee pay and non-pecuniary beneﬁts) there is no systematic
exploration in the literature. But the scarce empirical evidence presented so far, refutes the
eﬀects that are traditionally predicted: pay levels are relatively inﬂexible and tend to increase
above-average after privatisation (Pendleton, 1997).
This study looks at the eﬀects of privatisation on wages in Portugal3 w h e r ep u b l i co w n e r s h i p
was widespread. More speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of direct transfer of ownership from public to
private sector4, are examined in a single sector: the Portuguese banking industry. A number
of diﬀerent arguments form the basis of this industry selection. First, until the mid1990s, the
privatisation program was asymmetric and biased sectorially. Its major incidence, in terms of
number of ﬁrms comprised or in terms of volume of revenues generated, was in the banking
industry (Ministério das Finanças, 1999, page 15). The privatisation comprised eleven compa-
1The research on this topic is volominous, see for instance, the review by Megginson and Netter (2001).
2In contrast, the eﬀect of market’s deregulation, a related policy, has deserved a relatively remarkable attention
in the labour literature, although mainly reﬂecting USA experience. For a recent survey, see Peoples (1998).
3Portugal is classiﬁed as the third largest privatiser in the OECD countries, after the New Zealand and the
United Kingdom (OECD, 1998).
4Although there are diﬀerent forms of privatisation, this study only focus the eﬀects of sales of public companies
on wages.
2nies, which accounted for more than 83% of banking employment in 1985, and raised about 3,3
billions of EUROS, the bulk (48%) of the total sales of state enterprises until the second quarter
of 1995. Moreover, the privatisation of the whole industry was started and completed between
1989 and 1996, whilst it is less advanced and still ongoing in some other economic sectors. In
addition, the developments of the Portuguese ﬁnancial sector, privatisation and deregulation,
are considered a remarkable success: “the main reform objectives were met” without “the con-
comitant ﬁnancial instability experienced by many other OECD countries”(OECD, 1999, page
94).
Second, the design of the privatisation program and the structure of the banking sector
provide a notable and promising opportunity to evaluate the economic eﬀects of a change in
ownership. Indeed, in contrast with the remaining industries, the privatisation in the ﬁnancial
sector did not aﬀect all public ﬁrms. There still continues to be a large state-owned ﬁnancial
group, which provide us with a valuable natural candidate as a control group to examine the
eﬀects of the reform. Moreover, the Portuguese banking industry structure is diverse (as will be
described below) allowing a variety of possible ways of deﬁning a control group, and therefore
provides multiple and fruitful comparisons.
Finally, although there is little research focusing on the banking labour market, prior re-
search provides evidence of rent-sharing behaviour in the industry, which potentially raises the
privatisation eﬀect. In fact, the structure and the industrial relations in the banking industry
(namely role of unions, level and trend of unionisation density, wage bargaining mechanisms,
ﬁrms size and ownership structure) contrasts sharply with those prevailing in the remaining sec-
tors. Given these dissimilarities, the eﬀects of privatisation are likely to diﬀer across industries.
Comparison of the eﬀects of privatisation in diﬀerent sectors is beyond the scope of this study.
Therefore, this work only focuses on the case of privatisation in banking industry.
This study uses individual-level data from a particularly appropriate dataset collected an-
nually by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Solidarity, Quadros de Pessoal,t oe v a l u a t e
the impact of privatisation on the wages of workers whose ﬁrms were transferred from the state
to the private sector. The longitudinal nature of the dataset allows us to build a panel dataset
covering a period before and after the reform and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator is adopted
to infer the impacts of the policy reform.
This work is structured as follows. Next section 2 reports critically the ﬁndings of recent
studies (theoretical and empirical research) concerning the impact of privatisation on wages.
It also includes related literature such as wage diﬀerentials in public and private sectors with
particular reference to Portuguese industrial sectors. The following section 3 explores the historic
3context of the privatisation reform and discusses the singularity of the banking labour market
in the context of the Portuguese economy. Section 4 describes the methodology implemented
to evaluate the eﬀects of the policy reform. The description of the data used and the empirical
evidence/results are outlined in Section 5. The last section summarises the main conclusions of
this study.
2 Privatisation and Wages: Theoretical and Empirical Litera-
ture Review
The theoretical literature regarding the eﬀects of privatisation on wages although fairly limited
is not consensual. In the ﬁrst model developed (Haskel and Szymansky, 1992 and 1993), pri-
vatisation implies a shift in the public ﬁrms’ objective function towards proﬁt maximisation and
a reduction on the union bargaining power. As a result, a convergence of pay levels between
privatised and other private ﬁrms is expected to occur. This result conﬁrms the prediction made
from the well established public/private wage diﬀerential literature: if on average, workers with
similar attributes are better paid in the public sector than in the private sector, then privatisa-
tion will put the former in a worse position. In contrast, the predictions which emerged from the
subsequent works, resulting from either extensions of the previous model (Haskel and Sanchis,
1995) or using completely diﬀerent analytical frameworks (De Fraja, 1993 and Goerke, 1998)
are ambiguous. Wages may either increase or decline, depending on the assumptions made
regarding the ﬁrms’ market power, unions role and nature of wage determination.
Apart from these models, which look at the eﬀects on the overall wage distribution, there is
a vast growing literature concerning the conditions that eﬀect the remuneration of one speciﬁc
occupation: top or chief executive managers5. According to this line of reasoning, the compen-
sation of top managers/executives tends to rise after privatisation as pay scale constraints are
released, executives are more explicitly linked to observable measures of ﬁrm performance and
have more bargaining power. In addition, if privatisation is associated with an increase in the
ﬁrm scale, managers have direct oversight of more activities, and hence may expect a higher
remuneration.
The empirical evidence concerning the eﬀects of privatisation on wages does not generally
reﬂect the diversity of results predicted by the theory. In fact, the work by Bishop and Kay
(1988), Haskel and Szymansky (1993) and Parker and Martin (1996) with reference to the United
5See for example Rosen (1992) for both theoretical and empirical survey.
4Kingdom, the work present by La Porta and Silanes (1999) relating to the Mexican economy
and the recent work by Brainerd (2002) regarding privatisation in Russia, show an unanimous
pattern: average real (employee) wage tends to increase after privatisation, whenever the control
group is deﬁned as the private/public sector or the whole economy.
This striking ﬁnding should nevertheless be treated with some caution for diﬀerent reasons.
First, excluding the recent work by Brainerd (2002), all previous research presented so far used
data collected from company accounts. Thus, an increase in the average wage (calculated as
wage costs divided by the total level of employment) over time, can be distorted by changes in
the hours worked or changes in the composition and attributes of the workforce. For instance,
if ﬁrms disproportionately ﬁre low wage workers after privatisation, then the average wage may
rise. Moreover, even if workforce composition remains constant, the wage increase might reﬂect
wage increases in narrow and speciﬁc occupations such as top or executive managers. Second,
the monopolistic position of many of the privatised ﬁrms studied, makes it impossible to compare
them with similar industry-matched ﬁrms. In this case, the comparison with the whole economy
may not allow us to isolate privatisation eﬀects from speciﬁc industry factors (only from the
business cycle). As Parker and Martin (1996) referred “each privatised company has its own
particular performance determined by the environment in which it operates”. Finally, in all but
Parker and Martin’s (1996) work, the timing period of post privatisation analysis varies widely,
spanning from 3 to 6 years, according to the privatisation date of each ﬁrm. As a consequence,
transitional and long term privatisation eﬀects can not be separated and these might be quite
diﬀerent6.
The empirical literature on the executive labour market corroborates the predictions sug-
gested by the theory. Although the main focus of this work relies on ﬁnding which is the best
explanation, among competing theories, to account for changes in executive remuneration, all
research seems to conﬁrm a signiﬁcant increase on the wage level of executive managers after
privatisation. For instance, Wolfram (1998) reports a wage increase of 200% for the chief exec-
utive oﬃcers after privatisation of British electricity industry. The same conclusion is obtained
when a broader concept of executives is used. For example, Bishop and Kay (1988) detected an
increase of 173%, 79% and 81% on the director remuneration on 12 privatised ﬁrms, 5 public
ﬁrms and a sample of leading private companies, while La Porta and Silanes reported a relative
wage increase of 47% for white collar employees.
There is little research explicitly concerned with the Portuguese banking labour market. In
6Gupta et al.(2001) discuss the impacts of privatisation on labour outcomes over time and Villalonga (2000)
detects opposite privatisation eﬀects on eﬃciency when the analysis includes a timing dimension.
5particular, Vieira et al. (1997) and Kiker and Santos (1991) attested to a signiﬁcant but unstable
wage premium to banking workers relative to the average paid by other industries. Apart from
this, there is further (but indirect) evidence of rent-sharing behaviour in banking industry. In
fact, while Portugal and Centeno (2001), found that the public/private wage diﬀerential in
Portugal is the widest within European countries, Vieira et al. (1997) points out that there
is a signiﬁcant wage premium to large ﬁrms and for workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements - these are two important features of banking industry as will be discussed in the
following section.
3 The Portuguese Banking Industry
The Portuguese banking industry was subject to a nationalisation process, between 1974 and
1976, which entirely changed the ﬁrm ownership structure in the country. Before 1974, the
economy was dominated by seven large national private conglomerates which controlled most of
the economy, around 75 per cent of the GDP and 99.6 per cent of total deposits in the ﬁnancial
system (Sousa and Cruz, 1995). These conglomerates were then dismantled. As a result, all
institutions in the banking sector (in the total 24 organisations) were expropriated and became
public. Only foreign-owned banks and very small ﬁnancial institutions escaped from this reform.
During this period, the State interference was also reinforced by a number of legal changes
enacted for the purpose of establishing a scheme of heavy regulation. These include the estab-
lishment in the Constitution that the process of nationalisation was irreversible, a law blocking
free entry into the industry and the imposition of tight restrictions on banking operations such
as credit ceilings and limits to deposit and credit rates. Even long after, when complete restric-
tions to free entry were removed in 1984, the State was still omnipresent in the banking industry:
public-owned banks employed 95 per cent of banking workers in 1988, the highest proportion
of public workers of any European country while it accounted for 80 per cent of the banking
market in 1989 (OECD, 1994 and OECD, 1991).
Privatisation reform introduced substantial changes in the ownership structure of this in-
dustry. Accelerated by economic and political stability (achieved for the ﬁrst time, since the
nationalisation period) and by an exceptional boom in 1986/87 in the usual thin stock market,
the ﬁrst law permitting partial privatisation was adopted in 1988 (law 84/88 from 20th July).
In April 1990, after the second Constitutional Amendment was laid down in June 1989, the lei
Quadro das Privatizações, (decree-law 11/90 from 5thApril) was passed allowing full privatisa-
tion of enterprises nationalised after 1974.
6The privatisation program started in the ﬁnancial sector given the advanced liberalised stage
prevailing in the industry and its strategic position with regard to the development of the
remaining economic sectors. In addition, the success of privatisation reform depended largely
on the level of development of the capital markets. In contrast with some other economic
sectors, and in part because other profound challenges that have occurred in this sector (namely
deregulation and technological development) the government opted for a policy of no interfering
in the public banks during the period before privatisation (Naumann, Reinhard (1995) and Sousa
and Cruz (1995)), leaving the economic restructuring for future private owners.
In terms of scheduled order of privatisation, ﬁrms were selected among those with a solid
ﬁnancial base operating according to the market rules (OECD, 1989). In practice, the timetable
was aﬀected by the economic and political cycles’ and by the international context (conﬂict in
Persic gulf in the end of 1990). Table 1 includes the number of banks in the industry, categorized
by ownership owner, between 1988 and 1997.
Table 1: Ownership structure in the banking industry
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
P u b l i c 1 2 1 1 1 08763322
Privatised∗ 01245699 1 0 1 0
P r i v a t e 2 72 72 82 62 93 23 63 64 04 3
N a t i o n a l 2 21 91 81 41 61 82 22 32 32 8
F o r e i g n 5 81 01 21 31 41 41 31 71 5
T o t a l 3 93 94 03 84 14 44 84 85 25 5
∗T h ed a t eo fﬁrst tranche sell of each ﬁrm is considered the date of eﬀective privatisation.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (from 1988 to 1997)
During eight years, ten7 out of the twelve public banks gradually became fully private. These
banks, which are included in the privatised category, are large long-established institutions of
more than 100 years old that employ on average about 3500 workers during the analysis’ period
. These institutions were initially private, became public via nationalisation process, and were
then privatised. In most cases, ownership rights were re-acquired by the Portuguese groups,
7Despite there were 11 and not 10 banks that were privatised between 1989 and 1997, I worked with only
10 banks. Two banks were excluded from the initial list. One bank didn’t appear in the data, while the other
bank was eliminated from the analysis because although privatised it was never a state ﬁrm. Rather, it resulted
from the transformation of a mutual agricultural credit cooperative into a bank in which the state had a minority
participation (15%). I also comprised the indirect privatisation of a public bank thorough the privatisation of the
group to which it belongs (Ministério das Finanças, 1999, page 22)
7which had owned them prior to the nationalisation wave (OECD, 1994). Due to this private-
public-private ownership path, privatisation reform in Portugal is termed as re-privatisation.
The remaining two public banks are included in the public category. Despite also including
long-established institutions, this group is more heterogeneous: at the end of the reform, it
comprises the largest institution in the market (around 10 000 employees) that was always in
public hands and a smaller institution (around 4000 employees) that became public after the
nationalisation wave. In contrast with previous categories, the group of private banks consists
mainly of newly arrived8, national or foreign, small ﬁrms (average around 200 employees).
The developments at the ownership level conditioned the type of industrial labour relations
in the industry. In particular, the structure of the unions and the decentralised mechanisms
of wage setting are unique to Portugal. Covering three diﬀerent geographical areas, the oldest
labour unions in the mainland9 represent all banking employees in the wage bargaining process,
regardless of the ownership of the bank. In fact, banking labour unions and a group of employers,
public and private (national and foreign), or their representatives meet each year to negotiate
the vertical collective bargaining agreement. This collective agreement, the most detailed and
extensive in Portugal, regulates the employability conditions (age and level of education), the
systems of remuneration and the normal number of workhours in the industry. In particular, it
delimits the starting wage level and the compulsory wage progressions for each of the 18 levels
in the 4 groups deﬁned to cover all the banking workforce. Firms are not obliged to subscribe
to all parts of the agreement, exemptions are mentioned at the end of the bargaining contract10.
Beyond this broad scope of the collective agreement, banking unions also have the monopoly
of providing a recognised health system supporting both active and retired employees. Therefore,
it is not surprising the strong attachment to unionism existent in the sector. In fact, this labour
segment displays the highest unionisation density in the economy. Furthermore, in contrast with
the decline of unionisation density in most economic sectors, the average unionisation rate in
the banking sector has being expanded markedly between the period 1974-78 and 1991-95, from
71% to 106%, Cerdeira (1997).
Despite this notable reinforcement of the union power, banking trade unions did not act
against privatisation. The resistance oﬀered was very limited, not co-ordinated, mostly being
made through internal speeches and pamphlets which rarely reported in the national press. An
8After the openess of the market to new entries in 1984.
9There is also a recent union, Sindicato dos Quadros Técnicos Bancários,c o v e r i n gd i ﬀerent professional cate-
gories in the banking industry.
10Foreign ﬁrms are more likely to not subscribe all parts of the agreement.
8interesting indicator of the tranquillity existent in the banking sector is the total absence of any
strike action (see Portugal, MTSS) during a turbulent period, between 1985 and 1997, marked
by lasting challenges: liberalisation, privatisation and technological advance.
Table 2: Mean charactheristics of banking employees by ﬁrm ownership
Private
Variables Time Public Privatised National Foreign
















Years of schooling 1989 9.7 9.2 10.5 10.7
1997 10.9 10.6 12.3 12.8
Age 1989 40 41 35 37
1997 41 44 36 37
Tenure 1989 13 14 8 10
1997 15 17 7 7
% Female 1989 34 24 17 40
1997 41 29 33 25
∗Wages are inﬂated to 1998 level using the Consumer Price Index. Standard deviation in paratheses.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTS (1989, 1997)
In terms of earnings and individual attributes, Table 2 exhibits the major trends during the
period of privatisation for the four ﬁrm categories described above. As the table reveals despite
the fact that this period was characterised by a strong increase of the real wage in the industry,
privatisation led to a convergency on the hourly pay level between privatised, public and private
national ﬁrms. On average, hourly wage increased more (31 percent) in privatised ﬁrms when
compared to public (29 percent), national (20 percent) or foreign ﬁrms (17 percent), between
1989 and 1997. This increase is even more impressive when the level of schooling and tenure
are taken into account. In fact, employees in privatised ﬁrms, who are substantially better
paid, are the oldest, the least educated and the most experienced in the banking sector. Hence,
this result conﬁrms the ﬁndings of previous literature: if one doesn’t control for changes in the
attributes/composition of the labour force and for the timing of the eﬀects, privatisation leads
to a remarkable increase in the wage level whenever public or private (national or foreign) ﬁrms
are used as control groups.
94 Econometric Considerations
This study estimates the impacts of privatisation on the wages of workers, whose ﬁrm’s owner-
ship was transferred from state to private hands. In particular, for those aﬀected by the reform,
the main question is: what would their wage have been if the privatisation program had not
been introduced? The design of the policy reform previously described in previous section 3
makes the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences11 approach a natural one to take. This approach considers
the privatisation reform itself an experiment, the treatment, and tries to ﬁnd a naturally occur-
ring comparison group that could reﬂect the properties of a control group in a properly designed
randomised social experiment. The average eﬀect of the reform on the individuals whose ﬁrms
were privatised, also referred to as the eﬀect of the treatment on treated, is recovered by compar-
ing the diﬀerence in average behaviour before and after the reform for the treated with the before
and after behaviour of the comparison or control group. Thus the selection of the comparison
or control group becomes a central part of this evaluation procedure.
To be more precise about the evaluation procedure, deﬁne by 1
 the logarithm of wage for
individual  in ﬁrm  at time  if ﬁrm  is exposed to the privatisation reform (treatment) and
0
 to be the logarithm of wage of individual  in ﬁrm  at time  if ﬁrm  is not exposed to the
treatment. Thus the impact for the  −  individual of the policy is 1
 − 0
.T h ea v e r a g e
privatisation eﬀect for those individuals whose ﬁrms’ ownership was transferred from state to
private hands ( =1 if ownership of ﬁrm  was transferred to private sector, =0if not) is
one’s main question, 	(1
 − 0
 | =1 ) 
 Clearly, the evaluation problem in observational
studies can be regarded as a missing data problem since one can not estimate 	(0
 | =1 )
directly. Suppose that  =0and  =1represent respectively the period before and after the
implementation of the reform. The key identifying assumption of this approach consists of,
	(0
 | =1 =1 )− 	(0
 | =1 =0 )=
	(0
 | =0 =1 )− 	(0
 | =0 =0 ) 
 (1)
This assumption implies that the change in the logarithm of wage in ﬁrms whose ownership
was transferred from state to private hands, would have been the same as in the other ﬁrms
that belong to the control group, if the privatisation reform had not taken place. Equivalently,
the wage growth over time is the same for each group in absence of the reform. In this case, the
11This approach is widely used to evaluate “interventions” of this nature in diﬀerent contexts. See for example
Card and Krueger (1994).
10missing counterfactual value can be replaced by,
	(0
 | =1 =1 )=	(0
 | =1 =0 )+
which is simply the logarithm of wage level in state ﬁrms that would become private, before the
privatisation, adjusted for wage growth in the control group given by,
 = 	(0
 | =0 =1 )− 	(0
 | =0 =0 ) 

This gives rise to a straighforward diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator,
 = 	(1
 − 0




 | =1 =1 )− 	(0





 | =0 =1 )− 	(0




Clearly, the ﬁrst key identifying assumption in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator requires
common time eﬀects across all groups. If macro time eﬀects have diﬀerential impacts across
groups, then the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates will not remain valid12.
Under this assumption, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator can also be obtained by a
regression using micro data pooled across all treated and control groups and all time periods,
 = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 ∗  +  +  +  (2)
where   =1if individual  belongs to a ﬁrm  subject to the privatisation reform,  =0
otherwise.  is a set of time dummies that identify for each individual the period after ( =1 )
and before ( =0 )the implementation of the policy reform. The unobservable term is speciﬁed
to be  +  + ,w h e r et h et e r m captures the eﬀects of unobserved time-invariant person
characteristics,  refers to the unobserved time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects and  is assumed to be
a white noise term.
Under this setup, it is also clear that the validity of this estimator also depends on the implicit
composition of the error term. In particular, if the expected logarithm of wage conditional on the
treatment status depends on transitory individual-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t s ,t h e nt h ed i ﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator will be inconsistent13. This can happen if individuals adjust their behaviour
in response to the introduction of the reform. For instance, if high skilled workers self select or
migrate after privatisation from public to privatised ﬁrms. Hence, special care is needed when
choosing the individuals that form both the control and treatment groups.
12See Meyer (1995) for a detailed list of “threats to validity” of this estimator.
13See Blundell and Dias (2000) for a precise description of this condition.
11In this speciﬁcation, both treated and control groups are identiﬁed by one single dummy
variable. When there are more than one control group, it is also required additional dummies
variables to identify each group and its interaction with time period dummies.
This simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach can also be extended, by adding a vector of
individual characteristics, in order to control for diﬀerences in observable attributes between
groups. In this case, the “adjusted” diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator is obtained by the follow-
ing wage equation,
 = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3  ∗  + X +  +  +  (3)
where X represents a vector of observable attributes of individual  in ﬁrm  at time 
 The
coeﬃcient of primary interest is the coeﬃcient of  ∗, which corresponds to the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimator. It indicates the percentage variation in the wage diﬀerential between
the treated and control groups during the period considered. This eﬀect here is termed as
privatisation or ownership eﬀect.
5 Data and Empirical Results
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator laid out above is obtained using individual-level data from
a particularly appropriate dataset, Quadros de Pessoal, collected by the Portuguese Ministry of
Labour and Solidarity. This is an extensive database of matched employer-employee information
based upon mandatory employer reports. It provides detailed information about each unit, ﬁrm
or employee, observed. For instance, information about location, total level of employment,
economic activity, type of management, total sales and social capital is available for each ﬁrm.
For each employee, gender, date of birth, level of schooling, occupation, full-time/part-time
status, earnings, duration of work and the mechanism of wage bargaining are known, as well as
the location and industry of the employing ﬁrm.
The creation of the analysis data set involved the selection of the individuals that form
both the control and treatment group, the deﬁnition of the time period of analysis and the
construction of the outcome variable(s) of interest from the variables already in the data set.
Following the principle “the more comparison groups the better”, (Meyer, 1995), this study
uses information about wages from the four ﬁrm categories that prevail in the banking industry
(described in section 2) to perform the analysis. Public, private national and private foreign
ﬁrms (hereafter referred to just as national and foreign ﬁrms, respectively) are deﬁned as the
three comparison/control groups while privatised ﬁrms constitute the treatment group. Thus,
12as all ﬁrm groups belong to the same sector, it is guaranteed to equate macro trend eﬀects across
groups14.
Public ﬁrms form the natural candidate control group given their ownership. On the other
hand, comparing the change in the wage diﬀerential with private (national and foreign) ﬁrm
g r o u p sc a nb ev i e w e da sm e a s u r i n gt h ew a g ee ﬀo r to fc a t c h i n gu pw i t ht h ew a g ep a t t e r np a i d
by these groups. This is particularly appealing when private national ﬁrms are considered. As
mentioned in section 3, almost all new owners of privatised ﬁrms were the previous owners before
the nationalisation wave took place in the 1970s. Foreign ﬁrms appear as a neutral control group
as they were not subject to the reform but experienced common macro eﬀects.
In terms of the time period for performing the analysis, the ﬁrst step consisted of drawing
individual information from banking employees and ﬁrms for the period between 1989 and 1997.
This selection of the time period was based on the economic context of the banking sector.
The year 1989 corresponds to the beginning of a competitive environment15, 16 in the banking
market, whilst 1997 is the last year of analysis as the privatisation reform ﬁnished in 1996 and
during 1998 the ﬁrst merger in banking industry involving recently privatised ﬁrms occurred.
In the second step, after selecting the control and treatment ﬁrm groups for each of the
ten ﬁrms privatised, samples including employees that remained in all ﬁrm groups after  years
of the implementation of privatisation (year 0) were extracted17. In particular, independent
samples were constructed for each  varying between one and four years. Thus, the eﬀects of the
reform are examined on 63%, 51%, 46% and 43% of the total banking workforce after one, two,
three and four years, respectively, of the introduction of privatisation. This choice is particularly
convenient in order to control the eﬀects of individual self selection and worker mobility within
ﬁrms during the period of the analysis. The sample is restricted to those employees aged
between 18 and 65 according to the vertical collective agreement deﬁnition. Only observations
with missing variables needed to perform the analysis were dropped.
The logarithm of hourly wage was used as output measure18. This was computed as the
14Implicitly, it is assumed common eﬀects for ﬁrms with diﬀerent portfolio of customers, namely, consumers
and ﬁrms.
15The deregulation process of the ﬁnancial system started in 1984 but by the time privatisation was implemented
(1989) most of the price and entry barriers had already been removed, although the complete freedom was not
reached until the end of 1992 (OECD, 1999).
16This choice is not particularly disturbing since the privatisation of the ﬁrst bank started on the 10th of July
of 1989 whereas the inquiry occurred in March
17As mentioned previously on section 3, restructuring occurred after and not before the implementation of the
reform. Also note, that now,  doesn´t correspond to a calendar year.
18This variable is commonly used in the related literature of the impact of market´s deregulation on wages. See
13logarithm of the sum of monthly base wage plus the regular and irregular components of the
wage19, payment indexed to tenure and overtime divided by normal and extra hours worked.
Wages were converted to real terms (1998 prices) using a consumer price index.
In the presence of a balanced panel built as described, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator
m a ya l s ob eo b t a i n e db yd i ﬀerenting from period 0 equation 3, previously adjusted to include
three comparison or control groups. In practice, a separate equation20, 21 was estimated for
each  equals to 1, 2, 3 and 4,
 − 0 = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + (X − X0)+
X
 +  − 0 (4)
where   and are binary variables that identify if individual  works in a privatised,
national or foreign ﬁrm  respectively. The workers from public ﬁrms form the omitted group.
In this speciﬁcation, 1 corresponds to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator from equation 3,
3 when public ﬁrms form the control or comparison group. When national (foreign) ﬁrms work
as control group the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator is given by 1−2 (1 − 3)
 The vector
X includes control variables for the number of schooling years (education), seniority, potential
experience and its square, logarithm of ﬁrm size and logarithm of total duration of work22.T h e
term
P
 consists of time dummy variables added to the speciﬁcation in order to account for
diﬀerences in the economic cycle during the time period of privatisation. Looking at Table 1
and when  =1  this term would represent six indicator variables according to each privatisation
date. Given the omission of the year 1990 in the dataset, the term
P
 corresponds either to
ﬁve (when  =1 ) ,f o u r( w h e n =2 3) or three (when  =4 )binary variables.
Table 3 and 4 provide the results of the estimated privatisation eﬀect on wages for men and
women, respectively. As discussed previously in section 2, for these two demographic groups,
for example, the work by Black and Strahan (2001) that examines the eﬀect of deregulation on earnings in the
american banking industry. Nevertheless, there are no substantial changes when monthly wage is alternatively
used.
19Irregular component of the wage relates to the amount paid in March relative to Christmas, holiday or other
irregular subsidies while regular component of the wage includes the allowances paid such lunch, transportation,
lodging, children or productivity premia.
20This ﬂexible speciﬁcation allows diﬀerent structure of real wage-change over time is referred in Heckman and
Hotz (1989). McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) apllied this speciﬁcation to explore the eﬀects of onwership changes
on wages and employment, using plant-level data.
21The potential endogeneity of privatisation is not adressed here, given the missing ﬁrm’s key variables in the
dataset, namely total sales and social capital, for the period and industry covered.
22Other variables such as regional dummies, bargaining regime status, part-time status and occupation indica-
tors although available from the data were not, individually and jointly, statistically signiﬁcant and thus, excluded
from the analysis.
14the expected theoretical eﬀects of privatisation are ambiguous. In the following table, each row
corresponds to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of privatisation according to
the control group speciﬁed on the left handside of the table. For example, the ﬁgure -.084 (ﬁrst
row, second column) from table 3, indicates an erosion of 8.4-percent 23 on the wage diﬀerential
of retained men by privatised ﬁrms when compared to retained male employees in public ﬁrms,
after two years of the introduction of the reform.
Table 3: DinD estimates of the impact of privatisation on log hourly wage of men



























Sample Size 110,601 69,388 53,064 33,752
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
As Table 3 reveals, the eﬀects of privatisation, in contrast with previous literature, varied
according time and control group considered. Nevertheless, one can detect an obvious U-shaped
relationship between time of restructuring and wage variation rate regardless the choice of the
control group, conﬁrming the existence of privatisation dynamic eﬀects detected by Villalonga
(2000). In fact, men experienced negative wage growth rates during the ﬁrst two years after
privatisation, which were clearly reversed in the subsequent period.
T h e s ew a g eg r o w t hl o s s e sw e r ep a r t i c u l a r l yi n t e n s ea f t e rt w oy e a r so fi m p l e m e n t a t i o no ft h e
reform, although quite similar across the three comparison groups. This result supports the
general objective of restructuring (cost reducing) implicit in the implementation of the policy
and indirectly conﬁrmed by Pinho (1999). This author detected for the Portuguese banking
industry, a signiﬁcant improvement in the eﬃciency level between 1988-97, more pronounced
among the privatised institutions. Moreover, this result is also consistent with McGuckin and
Nguyen (2001) ﬁndings regarding the eﬀects of ownership changes in the US manufacturing
sector: around 76% of employees experienced lower wage growth rates after the ownership
change. On the other hand, deregulation of the product market, a related policy implemented
in order to increase market’s level of competitiveness, yields in general to declines in the wage
growth rate. For instance, Black and Strahan (2001) ﬁnd that in the US banking industry male
23The tables already present wages diﬀerentials in percentage calculated as (e
coeﬃcient-1).
15wages fell by 12.5 percent
Three years post-reform the eﬀects of privatisation are mixed whereas in the fourth year
after privatisation wages grew faster for those workers who retained their jobs in privatised
ﬁrms when compared to public or foreign ﬁrms, respectively. For this period of analysis, the
results are then comparable to those found by Parker and Martin (1996) despite the fact that
their analysis include all workforce regardless the gender. These authors ﬁnd that after four or
ﬁve years privatisation, wages on average, had increased more between 0.0 and 8.4 percent in 7
out 11 privatised ﬁrms in UK, when compared to whole economy.
These results then reﬂect a change in the pay policy of privatised ﬁrms. In fact, after ﬁrms
have completed the main adjustments (elimination of redundant labour force and reduction of
wage growth), the remaining and more likely productive labour force has to be rewarded in order
to reduce turnover. In line with eﬃciency wage theories and due to the higher homogeneity
of the employees (in terms of observable characteristics) prevailing in the four ﬁrms’ categories,
privatised ﬁrms have to pay higher wage growth rates in order to equate the wage level paid
by the remaining ﬁrms (either public or private) in the industry. On the other hand, workers
may also had employed a recognized higher level of eﬀort and thus increased productivity, as
a response of fearing an eventual threat of dismissal given the uncertainty introduced by the
reform.
Table 4: DinD estimates of the privatisation impact on log hourly wage of women



























Sample Size 41,551 23,948 19,480 13,209
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
For women, similar conclusions can be inferred from Table 4. In particular, the same U-
shaped relationship between wage variation and time restructuring is observed, regardless of
the choice of the control group. Wage growth cuts are again stronger and analogous across
comparison groups after two years of the reform. The major diﬀerence is that the intensity of
wage decline with respect to public ﬁr m si sl o w e rt ow o m e ni nt h eﬁrst year of analysis. This
diﬀerence may reﬂect a less favourable wage diﬀerential between privatised and public ﬁrms for
16women than men before the implementation of privatisation. As a result, women felt a lower
wage decline when compared to public ﬁrms in the ﬁrst year.
The results presented so far regarding the eﬀects of privatisation on male and female workers
are surprising, as they seem to contradict the predictions of the Gary Becker model that product
market competition drives out gender discrimination. If this were the case24,t h e nw o m e n ,w h o
earn on average less than men, would have improved their relative position either experiencing
lower wage losses or stronger wage gains, according to the timing of the eﬀects. Unless strong
composition eﬀects occurred at the same time as privatisation, such as relatively more women
moving into higher skilled occupations after privatisation, the results shown above would cor-
roborate Gary Becker’s prediction. Nevertheless, the variable variation in occupation was not
signiﬁcant in equation 3, which rules out this hypothesis.
Table 5: DinD estimates of the privatisation impact on log hourly wage of managers



























Sample Size 7702 4742 3573 2087
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. ∗∗∗ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level
Next Table 5 contains the results for male managers. Following Lopes and Silanes (1999)
work, a broad concept of top managers was adopted including only those managers that per-
formed the same function before and after the implementation of the reform. For this group,
the theoretical predictions point to a clear increase in the wage growth rate. Surprisingly, the
empirical evidence indicates the opposite eﬀect. The wage diﬀerential has been reduced sig-
niﬁcantly during the period of wage decline previously identiﬁed. Further, the magnitude of
the slower wage growth, between 13 and 16 percent, is substantially larger than the wage loss
detected before. In addition, the evidence on wage growth gains after the second year are less
compelling.
These ﬁndings may suggest that this group had been enjoying substantial rents before the
24Research on the impact of the market’s product deregulation on racial and gender discrimination, is typically
supportive of shrinking diﬀerentials. For instance, Black and Strahan (2001) reports that in the US banking
industry wages fell by 12.5 and 2.9 percent, for men and women respectively, after branching deregulation.
17Table 6: DinD estimates of the privatisation impact on log wage components of managers
Public National Foreign Sample
Time Eﬀect Wage Components













































































Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ denote statistically signiﬁcant from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
implementation of the reform. In order to examine the robustness of this hypotheses, the
equation previously speciﬁed was also estimated considering each of the three components of
the logarithm of hourly wage. In particular, the equation was estimated using the logarithm
of the hourly eﬀective wage as deﬁned by the vertical collective agreement, the logarithm of
irregular subsidies and the logarithm of regular subsidies of the wage. Table 6 presents the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates for these three wage components.
As suspected, two or three years after the introduction of the reform, the main driving
force explaining the wage diﬀerential decline was the irregular component of the wage. In
fact, during this period, the irregular wage subsidies diﬀerential was reduced between 73 and
91 percent. However, this was observed only for a narrow subsample of managers. For the
remaining managers, the pattern is not clear unless the eﬀects are examined three years post-
reform. These results are however, not free from criticism. Although there is no recorded data,
it is well-known that in the banking industry, managers enjoy fat bonuses not included in their
18cash compensation such as free car or excellent insurance schemes.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the impact of privatisation on wages in the Portuguese banking industry
for the period 1989-1997 using individual-level longitudinal data from Quadros de Pessoal.T h e
design of privatisation reform and the quality of the data employed, allows us, not only to
overcome the main limitations of the previous labour market privatisation literature, but also
to improve it in a number of ways.
Firstly, because privatisation reform did not aﬀect all public banks and the structure of the
industry is diverse, the eﬀect of privatisation is evaluated taking into account three comparison
ﬁrm groups within the banking sector. Thus, the comparison with groups within the same
industry guarantees, in principle, that the impact of any other economic factor not controlled
for can be adequately eliminated by the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator.
Secondly, the quality/nature of the matched employer-employee dataset let us to built a bal-
anced panel data and thus, analyse the privatisation impacts on dimensions not yet explored.
The eﬀects were examined on those individuals who remained in privatised ﬁrms after the in-
troduction of the reform. In particular, the eﬀects were analysed on three diﬀerent demographic
groups: men, women and male top managers. Further, in contrast with almost previous re-
search, this paper uses the actual instead of estimated (total labour costs divided the level of
employment) wage paid to individuals and also uses human control variables. Finally, the lon-
gitudinal nature of dataset permits us to assess the magnitude of the privatisation eﬀects over
time. The eﬀects of privatisation on wages were examined after one, two, three and four years
of its introduction.
The main lesson of this study is that the time dimension of analysis is highly important. For
both men and women, a clear U-shaped relationship between time of restructuring and wage
variation was found, regardless of the choice of the comparison group. During the ﬁrst and second
years after the introduction of reform, both demographic groups experienced similar wage losses,
which were reversed after the third year. Hence, the results presented in this study conﬁrm the
previous research if long term eﬀects are considered. Nevertheless, wages in privatised ﬁrms,
a g a i nf o rb o t hm e na n dw o m e n ,t e n dt oa l i g nw i t ht h ep a t t e r np a i db yt h er e m a i n i n gﬁrms in
the industry. Estimates for managers surprisingly contradict the theoretical predictions as this
group experienced stronger and lasting wage growth losses than the overall distribution.
There are at least two areas of further work. First, the eﬀects of privatisation on wages have
19been examined on those workers who kept their jobs in the same ﬁrms in the banking industry.
A full evaluation needs to consider the wage variation of banking workers that moved to ﬁrms in
and out of the industry after the reform. A second hypotheses includes the analysis of whether
or not privatisation led to diﬀerent remuneration of observable individual attributes.
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